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We consider whether or not a central bank should respond directly to financial market 
conditions when setting monetary policy. Specifically, should a central bank put weight on 
interbank lending spreads in its Taylor rule policy function? Using a model with risk and 
balance sheet effects in both the real and financial sectors (Davis, "The Adverse Feedback 
Loop and the Effects of Risk in the both the Real and Financial Sectors" Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 66, 
November 2010) we find that when the  conventional parameters in the Taylor rule (the 
coefficients on the lagged interest rate, inflation, and the output gap) are optimally chosen, 
the central bank should not put any weight on endogenous fluctuations in the interbank 
lending spread. However, the central bank should adjust the risk free rate in response to 
fluctuations in the spread that occur because of exogenous financial shocks, but we find that 
the central bank should not be too aggressive in its easing policy. Optimal policy calls for  a 
two-thirds of a percentage point cut in the risk free rate in response to a financial shock that 
causes a one percentage point increase in interbank lending spreads. 
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The past few years have witnessed how ￿nancial sector risks could be spread across countries￿
borders to cause a ￿nancial and economic calamity worldwide. This overwhelming episode has
stimulated a surged interest in investigating whether and how monetary policy should respond to
variations in ￿nancial market conditions. A popular view is that the central bank should include
some interbank credit spreads in a Taylor type monetary policy rule. In his testimony on February
26, 2008 before the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, John B.
Taylor argued that the intercept term in a Taylor type rule for monetary policy, that is, the natural
rate of interest, should be adjusted downward in proportion to observed increase in the spread
between the term Libor rate at three month maturity and an index of overnight federal funds rates
expected for the same period. Similar views have been expressed by others, including Goodfriend
and McCallum (2007), De Fiore and Tristani (2007), McCulley and Toloui (2008), Meyer and Sack
(2008), Curdia and Woodford (2009 and 2010), Woodford (2010), and Mishkin (2010a and 2010b).
In this paper, we examine whether and how a Taylor type monetary policy rule should be
modi￿ed in an environment featuring ￿nancial frictions and ￿nancial sector risks. A de￿ning
feature of our model is a careful distinction between exogenous and endogenous changes in the
￿nancial market conditions, which we capture by an interbank lending spread. A robust ￿nding in
the paper is that both the natural rate of interest and the risk free policy rate should be adjusted
directly to an exogenous variation in the spread, which we call a ￿nancial sector shock, but neither
should respond directly to any endogenous movement in the spread.
Our paper is a study of optimal simple rules for central banks in an open-economy monetary
model that features multiple sources of frictions and risks in both real and ￿nancial sectors. Esti-
mated simple monetary policy rules typically take the form of a policy rate as a function of in￿ ation
and the output gap, as well as the lagged policy rate. Whereas stabilizing the variability in in-
￿ ation and the output gap are the basic characteristics of the celebrated Taylor rule (e.g., Taylor,
1993), subsequent studies reveal substantial evidence of interest rate smoothing in monetary policy
practice (e.g., Rudebusch, 1995; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1998 and 2000; Orphanides, 2001).
Arguments in favor of such policy rules have been made using structural models where the cen-
2tral bank￿ s loss function consists of variations in in￿ ation, the output gap, and interest rate (e.g.,
Woodford, 2003a). Desirability of such policy rules or their variants have been shown in models
with sticky prices in one sector (e.g., Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999; Goodfriend and King, 2001;
Aoki , 2001), in multiple sectors (e.g., Mankiw and Reis, 2003; Huang and Liu, 2005), in multiple
countries (e.g., Benigno, 2004; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2002), and with both sticky prices and
sticky wages (e.g., Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000; Amato and Laubach, 2003). The importance
of interest rate smoothing is especially emphasized by Woodford (2003b). The robustness of such
simple policy rules have been shown in various modeling environments (e.g., Levin and Williams,
2003; Levin, Wieland, and Williams, 1999 and 2003; Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams, 2005;
see Taylor and Williams, 2009b for a survey).
These models all feature a frictionless ￿nancial world. In this paper, we examine how such simple
monetary policy rules might need to be modi￿ed in an environment featuring ￿nancial frictions and
￿nancial sector risks. Our model takes its root in the classic ￿nancial accelerator literature pioneered
by Gertler (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), among others. These papers incorporate
frictions in ￿nance for manufacturing ￿rms, but they do not model ￿nancial intermediaries. Some
recent studies incorporate ￿nancial intermediaries in modeling, but they abstract from frictions or
risks in the ￿nancial sector. For instance, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2008) model banks,
but they do not allow for frictions or risks within the banking sector. A few recent papers like Meh
and Moran (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Dib (2010) model
￿nancial frictions within the ￿nancial sector, in the form of collateral constraints, but they do not
allow for ￿nancial sector risks. All of these studies focus on the mechanism of ￿nancial frictions in
transmitting real or monetary shocks.
Our model builds on Davis (2010) but is concerned about the design of optimal simple monetary
policy rules in both a closed and an open-economy monetary environment that features multiple
sources of frictions and risks, in both real and ￿nancial sectors. The model has four important
features. First, it incorporates ￿nancial intermediaries, and frictions and risks in both the manu-
facturing industries and the ￿nancial sector. Thus, the model features balance sheet e⁄ects on both
the demand and supply sides of the credit market. Second, it incorporates sticky wages, in addition
to sticky prices, so monetary policy faces a nontrivial trade-o⁄between di⁄erent components of the
3central bank￿ s objective even when the ￿nancial frictions and risks are muted, while in the baseline
case the policy trade-o⁄ is multi-dimensional. Third, we consider both a closed and open-economy
setting to take into account frictions and risks in not only domestic but international interbank
lending markets for short-term unsecured loans. Last, it distinguishes between endogenous and
exogenous ￿ uctuations in interbank lending spreads, the spread between the bank￿ s cost of capital
and the risk free rate. As we show below, exogenous and endogenous ￿ uctuations in the interbank
spreads play fundamentally di⁄erent roles in determining an optimal simple monetary policy rule.
Our results are easy to summarize. Starting with the standard case that abstracts from ￿nancial
frictions and ￿nancial sector risks, we derive a simple optimal rule in terms of the respective
responsiveness of policy rate to the variability in in￿ ation and the output gap as well as lagged
policy rate, much in line with the standard literature on optimal monetary policy. We then ￿nd
that the presence of ￿nancial frictions calls for a greater degree of gradualism in the interest rate
rule. This ￿nding supports the classic view of Goodfriend (1987) and Cukierman (1991) in support
of interest rate smoothing from the perspective of ￿nancial stability. In addition, policy also shifts
weight from output gap stabilization to in￿ ation stabilization in the presence of ￿nancial frictions.
This is consistent with the ￿nding by Lee (2010) who models ￿nancial frictions on the households￿
side, whereas we model ￿nancial frictions and risks on the sides of ￿rms and banks.1
But, in contrast to the standard models that abstracts from ￿nancial frictions and ￿nancial
sector risks, our model features more than one interest rate. Time varying spreads in our model
have an allocative role. Issing (2006) and Goodhart (2007) suggest that such spreads may have
implications for monetary policy practice. It is on this end we ￿nd it important to distinguish
between what we term endogenous ￿ uctuations in the spread from exogenous ￿ uctuations.
Endogenous ￿ uctuations in the spread are the essence of a ￿nancial accelerator model. In
this model with ￿nancial frictions in the banking sector, the interbank lending spread ￿ uctuates
countercyclically in response to endogenous ￿ uctuations in a bank￿ s capital structure and loan loss
ratios. In this paper￿ s most interesting ￿nding, we ￿nd that when the conventional parameters
of the Taylor rule, the coe¢ cients on the lagged interest rate, the in￿ ation rate, and the output
gap, are chosen optimally, the central bank should ignore these endogenous ￿ uctuations in the
1Recent welfare-based monetary policy evaluations in models with ￿nancial frictions on the households￿side also
include Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2009).
4spread. Since these ￿ uctuations are the endogenous reactions to other macroeconomic variables in
the model, these ￿ uctuations in the spread provide no new information that is not already contained
in measures of the output gap and in￿ ation. Since the conventional Taylor rule parameters were
chosen optimally, the central bank has already found the optimal weighting of the information
contained in the in￿ ation rate and the output gap. Therefore putting any weight on a new term
that contains no new information would be sub-optimal.
However this may not be true for exogenous ￿ uctuations in the spread. We de￿ne exogenous
￿ uctuations in the spread as occurring because of some exogenous ￿nancial sector shock, for in-
stance, a sudden tightening of the credit market that occurs because of a sudden increase in ￿nancial
sector risk or uncertainty. This type of shock is documented by Taylor and Williams (2009a) who
describe the sudden increase in interbank lending spreads at the beginning of the ￿nancial crisis
in August 2007. Bordo and Haubrich (2010) document historical instances of these credit market
shocks going back to 1875. Helbling et al. (2010) and Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009)
use econometric techniques the single out these credit shocks and demonstrate their importance
in explaining the ￿ uctuations in broader macro aggregates. Within the framework of a ￿nancial
accelerator model, a number of recent papers, like Attah-Mensah and Dib (2008), Christiano et
al. (2003 and 2008), Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Jermann and Quadrini (2009), and Gilchrist,
Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009) have introduced credit shocks into a DSGE model.
We ￿nd that ￿ uctuations in the spread that are caused by these exogenous credit shocks may
contain new information that is not already found in measures of the output gap and the in￿ ation
rate. Thus the central bank may want to reduce both the natural rate of interest and the risk
free policy rate in response to an exogenous increase in the interbank spread that is caused by a
credit market shock. Furthermore, in the open economy versions of the model, the central bank will
want to react to exogenous ￿ uctuations in both home and foreign interbank lending spreads. While
the central bank will want to employ an accommodative monetary policy in response to a credit
market shock, we ￿nd that the central bank will not want to fully accommodate the shock. To fully
accommodate the shock would imply that the central bank would lower the risk free rate by 1% in
response to a 1% exogenous increase in the spread. We ￿nd that this degree of accommodation is
too extreme. Optimal policy is for the central bank to reduce the risk free rate by about 0.7% in
response to a 1% exogenous increase in the spread.
5Our paper is related to an emerging literature of welfare-based monetary policy evaluations
using models with ￿nancial frictions, including Moessner (2006), Faia and Monacelli (2007), De
Fiore and Tristani (2007), Teranishi (2008), Sudo and Teranishi (2008), Curdia (2008), Curdia and
Woodford (2009 and 2010), Faia and Iliopulos (2010), Merola (2010), and Kolasa and Lombardo
(2011), among others. Besides our modeling details, such as the open-economy setup with both
sticky prices and sticky wages, what distances our study from this literature is the incorporation
of ￿nancial sector shocks, frictions in ￿nance in both real and ￿nancial sectors, their distinguished
roles, and the distinction between exogenous changes of domestic and foreign interbank spreads
and endogenous movements in these spreads in determining simple optimal monetary policy rules.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model that is used to assess the
desirability of including interbank spreads in the central bank￿ s policy function. The model is a
multi-country new Keynesian model, with ￿nancial frictions introduced in both real and ￿nancial
sectors that enable the model to move away from the irrelevance of balance sheets implied by the
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem. The model is very similar to that presented in Davis (2010),
but unlike the model in Davis (2010), the central bank￿ s policy function is modi￿ed to give the
central bank the option of responding to ￿nancial market conditions. In addition, in this paper we
introduce a new type of shock that is a direct shock to risk and uncertainty in the ￿nancial sector.
This new type of shock provides the basis for the exogenous ￿ uctuations in the interbank spread
that become so important when discussing optimal simple policy rules. Then the calibration of
the model is discussed in section 3. The optimal parameters in the Taylor rule as derived from
simulations of the model are presented in section 4. First we discuss how the presence of ￿nancial
frictions in the model induces the central bank to put more weight on interest rate smoothing in
their Taylor rule function. Then we discuss whether or not the central bank will want to directly
target interbank lending spreads. Finally, section 5 concludes and o⁄ers some suggestions for further
research.
2 Model
In the model there are ￿ve types of agents: ￿rms, entrepreneurs, capital builders, banks, and
households. There is also a central bank that sets the risk free nominal rate of interest.
6Firms use capital and labor inputs to produce tradeable output that is used for consumption
and investment. Each ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated good and sets prices according to a Calvo
(1983) style price setting framework, thus giving rise to nominal price rigidity.
Entrepreneurs own physical capital and rent it to ￿rms. This physical capital is ￿nanced par-
tially through debt and partially through equity. In every period, an individual entrepreneur faces
an idiosyncratic shock to the value of their physical capital assets. While these shocks have no
direct aggregate e⁄ects, they introduce heterogeneity among entrepreneurs. The shock is uninsur-
able, and a fraction of entrepreneurs may experience an abnormally large shock to the value of their
physical capital stock and be pushed into bankruptcy, while most will not. The uncertainty over
which entrepreneurs will be pushed into bankruptcy and which will not is a type of ￿nancial friction
in the real sector. The ratio of debt to equity on an entrepreneur￿ s balance sheet determines their
ability to withstand a shock to the value of their capital stock. Creditors use the entrepreneur￿ s
debt-equity ratio to determine the riskiness of lending to the entrepreneurial sector, giving rise to
a default risk interest premium that depends on the debt-equity ratio.2
Capital builders purchase ￿nal goods from ￿rms for physical capital investment. There are
diminishing marginal returns to physical capital investment. In periods when investment is high,
the marginal return of that investment in producing new physical capital is low, and vice versa.
This gives rise to a procyclical relative value of physical capital.
Banks channel savings from households to ￿rms in the form of working capital loans and to
entrepreneurs in the form of physical capital loans. A bank ￿nances its asset portfolio partially
through equity and partially through debt, which is made up of deposits from domestic and foreign
households.
Due to bankruptcies in the real sector, a portion of a bank￿ s portfolio of physical capital loans
will go into default in any given period. While these loan losses are not great enough to push
the entire banking sector into insolvency, there is heterogeneity among banks with regards to their
exposure to the set of non-performing loans. A few banks may be over-exposed to the set of bad
loans, and they themselves may be pushed into insolvency. The uncertainty about which banks are
over-exposed to the set of non-performing loans and which are not is a type of ￿nancial friction in
2The fact that this idiosyncratic shock is uninsurable provides the necessary violation of the complete markets
assumption necessary to overcome the implications of the Miller and Modigliani (1958) theorem.
7the banking sector. The ratio of debt to equity on a bank￿ s balance sheet determines their ability
to absorb loan losses, so the debt-equity ratio determines the ex-ante riskiness of a particular bank.
This gives rise to an environment where the spread between interbank lending rates and the risk
free rate is increasing in the leverage ratio of the banking sector.
Households supply labor to ￿rms and consume ￿nal output. Furthermore they supply a di⁄er-
entiated type of labor and set wages according to a Calvo-style wage setting process, giving rise to
nominal wage rigidity.
Finally, the central bank tries to stabilize output and prices by controlling the risk free nominal
rate of interest. The central bank sets policy using a Taylor rule function combining the current
period￿ s in￿ ation rate, output gap, and the lagged risk free nominal interest rate. We will also
consider the case where the home and foreign interbank lending spreads are also part of the Tay-
lor rule. When considering the central bank￿ s optimal reaction to ￿nancial sector developments,
speci￿cally we are trying to ￿nd the optimal coe¢ cients on the spreads in the Taylor rule.
The remainder of this section presents the actual details of the model. In section 4 we will
examine two versions of the model, the closed economy, and two open economies. In what follows,
the key model equations are written for the open economy case. In the model￿ s notation, the
relative size of the home country is n and the relative size of the foreign country is 1 ￿ n. In the
case of two large economies, n = 1
2. In the case of the closed economy, imagine that n = 1.
In what follows, all variables are written in per capita terms and foreign variables are dis-
tinguished by an asterisk (*). In the open economy version of the model, the two countries are
symmetric, so foreign equations have been omitted for brevity except where absolutely necessary.
2.1 Firms
In the home country, intermediate goods producing ￿rms, indexed i 2 [0 n], combine capital and
labor, kt (i) and ht (i) to produce a unique intermediate good Yt (i). The ￿rm￿ s production function
is:
Yt (i) = Atht (i)
1￿￿ kt (i)
￿ ￿ ￿ (1)
8where At is an exogenous country speci￿c stochastic TFP parameter that is common to all ￿rms
and ￿ is a ￿xed cost parameter that is calibrated to ensure that ￿rms earn zero pro￿t in the steady
state.
The output from ￿rm i can be sold to the domestic market or sold as imports in the foreign
market:
Yt (i) = yd
t (i) + ym￿
t (i)
where yd
t (i) is output from ￿rm i that is sold domestically and ym￿
t (i) is the output that is imported
into the foreign country.
Intermediate goods from domestic and foreign ￿rms are then combined into one aggregate ￿nal
good. As in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), domestically supplied and imported intermediate
































where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic varieties and ￿ is the elasticity of substi-
tution between home and foreign varieties.
From this aggregator function the demand in the home country for the intermediate good from
domestic ￿rm i, where i 2 [0 n], as a function of aggregate demand is:
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Similarly, the demand in the home country for the intermediate good from foreign ￿rm i, where
i 2 (n 1], as a function of aggregate demand is:
ym





































1￿￿ is a price index of imported intermediate goods, and the aggregate















Firm i can discriminate when setting prices for the domestic or foreign market. Thus they can
set separate prices for the domestic and export markets. In period t, the ￿rm will be able to change
its price in the domestic market with probability 1￿￿p. If the ￿rm cannot change prices then they
are reset automatically according to Pd
t (i) = ￿t￿1Pd
t￿1 (i), where ￿t￿1 =
Pt￿1
Pt￿2.













t+￿ (i) ￿ MCt+￿yd
t+￿ (i)
o
where ￿t is the marginal utility of income in period t. As discussed in this paper￿ s technical











































which says that the ￿rm will set a price equal to a constant mark-up over marginal cost.
Write the domestic price set by the ￿rm that can reset prices in period t as ~ Pd
t (i) to denote
that it is an optimal price. Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same level,
so ~ Pd
t (i) = ~ Pd













Since a ￿rm has a probability of 1￿￿p of being able to change their price, then by the law of large
numbers in any period 1￿￿p percent of ￿rms will reoptimize prices, and the prices of ￿p percent of
￿rms will be automatically reset using the previous periods in￿ ation rate. Thus the domestic price
index, Pd

















The full details of this derivation as well as the derivation for prices set for the foreign market
10is located in the appendix.
The ￿rm hires labor and capital inputs, where Wt is the wage rate paid for labor input and
Rt is the capital rental rate, both of which the ￿rm takes as given. Furthermore the ￿rm must
pay their wage bill at the beginning of the period, prior to production. To do so they borrow
bwc
t (i) = Wtht (i). The ￿rm￿ s income after paying for capital and labor inputs is:
d
f
t (i) = Pd
t (i)yd
t (i) + Px
t (i)yx




t (i) is the export price for the intermediate good from ￿rm i, and rwc
t is the interest rate
on working capital loans. Since there is no default risk from lending working capital to ￿rms,
competition in the banking sector forces the rate on working capital loans down to the bank￿ s own
cost of capital, rwc
t = rb
t.







The ￿rm will choose ht (i) and kt (i) to maximize pro￿t in (5) subject to the production function
in (1). The working capital requirement implies that the cost of the labor input is Wt (1 + rwc
t )
and the cost of the capital input is Rt. Given these prices, the ￿rm￿ s demand for labor and capital
inputs are:
ht (i) = (1 ￿ ￿)
MCt
Wt (1 + rwc
t )
Yt (i) (6)















Entrepreneurs, indexed j 2 [0 n], buy capital from capital builders and rent it to ￿rms. At the
beginning of period t, entrepreneur j has a stock of capital, Kt (j), that he will rent to ￿rms
in period t at a rental rate Rt. In equilibrium, the aggregate stock of capital supplied by all
domestic entrepreneurs j is equal to the aggregate stock of capital demanded by all domestic ￿rms
11i,
R n
0 Kt (j)dj =
R n
0 kt (i)di.
Entrepreneurs ￿nance this stock of capital partially through debt. The entrepreneur borrows
be
t (j) from domestic banks to ￿nance their capital stock Kt (j). Thus the market value of the assets







t is the price of existing capital.
The end of the period the value of the non-depreciated capital stock for the average entrepreneur
is PK
t (1 ￿ ￿)Kt. However during the period, the individual entrepreneur j receives an idiosyncratic
draw that a⁄ects the relative price of their existing capital, so for entrepreneur j the end of period
value of their non-depreciated capital stock is:
!e
t (j)PK
t (1 ￿ ￿)Kt (j)
where !e
t (j) is a i.i.d. draw from a lognormal distribution on the interval [0 1) with mean 1 and
variance ￿2
e.
Since this draw has a mean 1, it has no e⁄ect on the aggregate capital stock. It simply introduces
heterogeneity among entrepreneurs, and in any given period a fraction of entrepreneurs receive a
draw that has a large adverse e⁄ect on the value of their existing capital (a small !e
t (j)) and thus
at the end of the period, the value of their liabilities exceeds the value of their assets.
During the period the entrepreneur rents his capital stock to ￿rms for a rental rate of Rt. The
entrepreneur ￿nances this capital stock with a loan from the bank with an interest rate re
t. Thus
at the end of the period, after the realization of !e
t (j), the nominal market value of entrepreneur
j￿ s assets is !e
t (j)PK
t (1 ￿ ￿)Kt (j) + RtKt (j). At the end of the period the nominal value of the
entrepreneur￿ s liabilities is (1 + re
t)be
t (j).
Thus, after the realization of !e
t (j), entrepreneur j is bankrupt if:
!e
t (j)PK
t (1 ￿ ￿)Kt (j) + RtKt (j) < (1 + re
t)be
t (j) (8)
12Thus the threshold value of !e
t (j) below which the entrepreneur goes bankrupt in period t and















Kt(j) is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets on an
entrepreneur￿ s balance sheet. The history of individual entrepreneur j will in￿ uence the level of
be




Kt(j) is equal across all entrepreneurs. This is a key
result for aggregation, for it implies that the bankruptcy cuto⁄ value ￿ !e
t does not depend on an
entrepreneur￿ s history. More intuition behind this result is presented at the end of this section and
a formal proof is presented in the appendix.
When deciding how much to lend to entrepreneurs going into next period and at what rate,
banks factor in the fact that if entrepreneur j does not default in period t + 1, creditors receive a
return of re
t+1. If the entrepreneur defaults, creditors receive a share of the entrepreneur￿ s remaining
assets, less the bankruptcy cost ￿e. The threshold value ￿ !e
t+1 in equation (9) determines whether
or not an entrepreneur goes into default next period. Thus the payo⁄ to creditors conditional of















t+1 (j)(1 ￿ ￿)PK
t+1Kt+1 (j) + Rt+1Kt+1 (j)
￿
if !e
t+1 (j) < ￿ !e
t+1
(10)
Perfect competition in the banking sector implies that the bank￿ s expected pro￿t is zero. So the
interest rate the bank charges on physical capital loans, re
t+1, is set such that the expected return,
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is the c.d.f. of the lognormal distribution of !e
t+1.











































is the percent of manufacturing ￿rms that declare bankruptcy.
Holding all else equal, this interest rate, re





. If there are ￿nan-





is increasing in ￿ !e
t+1. ￿ !e
t+1 is increasing in
the manufacturing ￿rm￿ s debt-asset ratio. Thus when there are ￿nancial frictions in the entrepre-
neurial sector, the interest rate on physical capital loans is increasing in the level of debt on an
entrepreneur￿ s balance sheet.
The cuto⁄ value of !e
t+1 (j) in equation (9) combined with the interest rate expression in (11)
demonstrates the feedback loop associated with ￿nancial frictions in the entrepreneurial sector.
When the price of existing capital, PK
t+1 falls, the cuto⁄ value ￿ !e
t+1 rises. This implies that more
￿rms will receive draws of !e
t+1 (j) below this cuto⁄ value and be forced into bankruptcy. When






t+1 increases as banks now demand a
higher interest rate to compensate for the increased bankruptcy risk. This higher re
t+1 means
higher interest expenses and lower pro￿t for the entrepreneur, which leads to a further increase in
the cuto⁄ value ￿ !e
t+1.
The end of period net worth for the entrepreneur that survives is the entrepreneur￿ s pro￿t in
time t plus the value of their non-depreciated capital stock:
~ Ne
t (j) = RtKt (j) ￿ (1 + re
t)be
t (j) + !e
t (j)PK
t (1 ￿ ￿)Kt (j)
The entrepreneur will pay a dividend to shareholders of de
t (j) and begin the next period with
net worth Ne
t+1 (j) = ~ Ne
t (j) ￿ de
t (j). Entrepreneurs that declare bankruptcy in period t pay no
dividend and drop out of the market, they are replaced with new entrepreneurs, which are endowed
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t) (12)









(1 ￿ F (￿ !e
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At the beginning of any period, entrepreneurs have di⁄erent levels of net worth Nt+1 (j) that
will depend on the entrepreneur￿ s history of idiosyncratic shocks !e
t (j).
The entrepreneur will acquire capital up to the point where the interest rate on bank loans is
















= 1, the left hand side of the above expression is the
same across all entrepreneurs j, which implies that re
t+1 is the same across all entrepreneurs.
2.3 Capital Builders
The representative capital builder converts ￿nal goods, given by equation (2), into the physical
capital purchased by entrepreneurs. At the end of period t, the non depreciated physical capital
stock is (1 ￿ ￿)Kt, and the physical capital stock at the beginning of the next period is Kt+1. The
evolution of the physical capital stock is given by:






where ￿0 > 0 and ￿00 < 0 implying that there are diminishing marginal returns to physical capital
investment. Capital builders purchase ￿nal goods for investment at a price Pt and sell existing
capital to entrepreneurs at a price PK
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Since ￿00 < 0, when It








Pt is high. This implies that during times
of high physical capital investment, when the ratio of investment to the existing capital stock is
high, the relative price of existing capital is high. Since investment is highly procyclical, capital
adjustment costs imply that the relative price of capital is highly procyclical as well.
2.4 Banks
Banks, indexed k 2 [0 n] make physical capital loans to domestic entrepreneurs. They ￿nance
this loan portfolio partially with equity and partially with borrowing from domestic and foreign
households.
At the beginning of period t, the value of the bank￿ s assets is Be
t (k), which is the bank￿ s stock
of loans to entrepreneurs. The value of the bank￿ s liabilities is bs
t (k) + b
sf
t (k), where bs
t (k) are the
deposits of domestic households and b
sf
t (k) are the deposits of foreign households.3
The bank also makes working capital loans to ￿rms in order to ￿nance the ￿rm￿ s wage bill. This
however is not listed as a beginning of period asset for the bank. By assumption this loan is made
after the beginning of the period and repaid before the end of the period. If the stock of working
capital loans were to appear as a asset for the bank at the beginning of period t, that would imply
that the loan was made in period t ￿ 1, which implies that the ￿rm made a decision about period
t￿ s labor input in period t ￿ 1.
Bankruptcy in the entrepreneurial sector in period t means the bank￿ s assets are worth less





t is the share of the average bank￿ s physical capital loan portfolio that
is lost to bankruptcy and liquidation costs.
￿e
t represents the share of the average bank￿ s physical capital loan portfolio that is lost to
3The same stock of bonds that is a liability to one party is an asset to another. Throughout this paper, when a
stock of bonds is an asset, it is written with a capital B, when the stock of bonds is a liability it is written with a
lower case b.
Thus market clearing in the bond market requires that the sum of physical capital loans across all banks equals









16bankruptcy and liquidation costs, however banks don￿ t hold fully diversi￿ed loan portfolios. Some
banks may be overexposed to the set of non-performing loans to the entrepreneurial sector. This
overexposure may be due to a regional bias in the bank￿ s portfolio, or it may be because a bank
has a certain core competency and is therefore overexposed to a certain sector of the economy.4











mean 1 and standard deviation ￿b
t.
If bank k receives a large draw !b
t (k), it implies that the bank is overexposed to the set of
non-performing loans and may itself face insolvency. The bank is insolvent if the end of period


















The threshold value of !b
t (k) above which bank k is forced to declare bankruptcy and below















t (1 + re
t)
(13)
Bank k￿ s history of idiosyncratic draws, !b
t (k), thus its history of exposure to non-preforming
sectors of the economy, will determine the levels of Be
t (k), bs
t (k), and b
sf
t (k). However, at the







t(k) and will have the same cost of capital, rb
t (k). This result is key for the aggregation
of balance sheet variables across a continuum of individual banks, for this implies that the cuto⁄
value ￿ !b
t is common across all banks. The formal proof of this claim is presented in the appendix.
When deciding how much to lend to bank k in the next period and at what rate, the bank￿ s
creditors factor in the fact that if the bank does not default, they receive a gross interest rate
1 + rb
t+1 (k). If bank k defaults, creditors receive nothing.5 Thus the expected payo⁄ to a bank￿ s
4Like the banks, many of which are now bankrupt or were acquired by healthier rivals, who were overexposed to
the subprime sector of the mortgage market during the recent ￿nancial crisis.
5The assumption that creditors receive nothing in the case of bank default is because the model is later calibrated
such that the spread between the interbank rate, r
b, and the risk free rate, i, in the steady state of the model is equal
to the historical average of the spread between the 3-month Libor and the 3-month T-bill. The Libor is an interbank
index rate that is based on the interest rate for unsecured lending to banks.











t+1 (k) ￿ ￿ !b
t+1
0 if !b
t+1 (k) > ￿ !b
t+1
(14)
Domestic and foreign depositors will extend bank k credit up to the point where the expected











































is the c.d.f. of the lognormal distribution of ￿ !b
t+1, and thus measures the








constant across all banks, the interbank lending rate, and thus banks￿cost of capital, is constant
across all banks.
A ￿rst order Taylor series expansion of the expression in (15) highlights the two factors, one




































t+1) < 0 is the elasticity of the spread with respect to changes
in the endogenous cuto⁄ value ￿ !b










t+1) > 0 is the elasticity
of the spread with respect to changes in the exogenous variable describing uncertainty in the
interbank mark, ￿b





ss ￿ 1, can be dividend into
two components, an endogenous component due to ￿ uctuations in the endogenous cuto⁄ value
￿ !b























as the exogenous component.
The end of period t net worth of the bank that is not over-exposed to the set of non-preforming




















The bank will pay a dividend to shareholders and begin the next period with a net worth
Nb
t+1 (k) = ~ Nb
t (k) ￿ db
t (k). Banks that were overexposed to the set of non-preforming loans and
thus were forced into bankruptcy end the period with no net worth and drop out of the market.
They are replaced with new banks that are endowed with start up capital ￿ Nb. Thus the net worth







































































Households, indexed l 2 [0 n], supply heterogeneous labor to ￿rms and consume from their labor
income, interest on savings, and pro￿t income from ￿rms, entrepreneurs, capital builders, and
banks.











subject to their budget constraint:
19PtCt (l) + Bs
t+1 (l) + StB
sf￿
t+1 (l) + F (￿ !e









= Wt (l)Ht (l) + d
f
t (l) + de
t (l) + dc





























t (l) ￿ St ￿ Bsf￿
￿2
where Ct (l) is consumption by household l in period t, Ht (l) is the household￿ s labor e⁄ort in
the period, Bs
t (l) is the household￿ s stock of deposits with domestic banks at the beginning of
the period, B
sf￿
t (l) is the stock of deposits with foreign banks, Wt (l) is the wage paid for the
household￿ s heterogenous labor supply, ￿b
t (￿b￿
t ) represents the small share of deposits to the home






t (l) are the household￿ s share of period t pro￿ts from ￿rms, entrepreneurs, capital builders
and banks, respectively.6
The household pays a small quadratic transactions cost to holding other than the steady state






t (l) ￿ ￿ Bsf￿
￿2
.
Each household supplies a di⁄erentiated type of labor. The function to aggregate the labor












0 ht (i)di. Since the household supplies a di⁄erentiated type of labor, it faces a







In any given period, household j faces a probability of 1￿￿w of being able to reset their wage,
otherwise it is reset automatically according to Wt (l) = ￿t￿1Wt￿1 (l).
If household j is allowed to reset their wages in period t they will set a wage to maximize the
6Market clearing in the market for deposits requires that the sum of deposits with domestic banks across all




t (l)dl = R n
0 b
s
t (k)dk, and that the sum of deposits with foreign banks across all domestic households equals the sum of




















Thus after technical details which are located in the appendix, the household that can reset













































Thus when wages are ￿ exible the wage rate is equal to a mark-up, ￿
(￿￿1), multiplied by the
marginal disutility of labor, 1+￿H
￿H   (Ht)
1
￿H , divided by the marginal utility of consumption, ￿t.
Write the wage rate for the household that can reset wages in period t, Wt (l), as ~ Wt (l) to
denote it as an optimal wage. Also note that all households that can reset wages in period t will
reset to the same wage rate, so ~ Wt (l) = ~ Wt.
All households face a probability of (1 ￿ ￿w) of being able to reset their wages in a given period,
so by the law of large numbers (1 ￿ ￿w) of households can reset their wages in a given period. The
wages of the other ￿w will automatically reset by the previous periods in￿ ation rate.
















The monetary policy instrument is the short term risk free rate, it, which is determined by the
central bank￿ s Taylor rule function:
21it+1 = iss + ￿i (it ￿ iss) + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
￿p￿t + ￿y^ yt + ￿rr^ pb




where ￿t = Pt
Pt￿4 ￿ 1, and ^ yt = GDPt
G ~ DPt ￿ 1, where G ~ DPt is the level of GDP at time t in an economy
with the same structure as the one just described and subject to the same shocks, only there are
no price or wage frictions, ￿p = ￿w = 0, and there are no ￿nancial frictions, ￿e = ￿b = 0.
When ￿r = ￿rf = 0, the central bank does not place any weight on conditions in the interbank
markets and the Taylor rule is simply the conventional Taylor rule with smoothing.
Recall from equation (16) that ￿ uctuations in the interbank lending spread r^ pb
t have an endoge-
nous and exogenous component, r^ pb
t = r^ p
b;endo
t + r^ p
b;exo
t . In another version of the Taylor rule,
we assume that the central bank can distinguish between these two components and potentially
respond di⁄erently to ￿ uctuations in the spread depending on whether it is due to endogenous or
exogenous factors. In this case the Taylor rule would take the form:
it+1 = iss+￿i (it ￿ iss)+(1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
















The model in the previous section is solved with a ￿rst-order approximation and the results are
found from simulations of the calibrated model. This section will begin by presenting the basic
parameter values used in this calibration. Then we will describe the various types of exogenous
shocks that will drive the simulations of the model and the estimation of these di⁄erent shock
processes.
The full list of the model￿ s parameters and their values is found in table 1.
The ￿rst eight parameters: the discount factor, the capital depreciation rate, capital￿ s share of
income, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, the bond adjustment cost
parameter, the labor supply elasticity, the elasticity of substitution between goods from di⁄erent
￿rms, and the elasticity of substitution between labor from di⁄erent households are all set to values
that are commonly found in the literature.






. It is the elasticity of the relative price of capital with respect to changes in the
investment-capital ratio. This parameter preforms the important functions of lowering the relative
volatility of investment and ensuring the procyclicality of the price of capital. Empirical estimates
of this parameter vary, but the value of 0:125 is in the middle of the range of empirical estimates
and ensures that the relative volatility of investment in the model is near what we see in the data.
The next two parameters in the table are the Calvo price and wage stickiness parameters. The
wage stickiness parameter is chosen such that on average a household adjusts their wages once a
year. The price stickiness parameter implies that prices are a little more ￿ exible than wages and is
taken from the DSGE estimation literature (see e.g. Christiano et al. 2005).
The next four parameters are all determined so that the steady state of the model is able to
match certain features of the data. The ￿ and ￿f parameters from the function that aggregates
home and foreign goods in (2) are set such that the home country in the open economy version
of the model have a steady state import share of 25%.7 The next two parameters, ￿ and   are
the ￿xed cost in the production of intermediate goods and the weight on the disutility from labor
in the household￿ s utility function, respectively. These are set to ensure that in the steady state,
intermediate goods ￿rms earn zero economic pro￿t and the household￿ s labor supply is unity.
Finally the last three parameters in the table relate to the risk of bankruptcy and liquidation
costs in either the banking or entrepreneurial sectors. The steady state value of ￿b
t measures the
steady state level of uncertainty in the ￿nancial sector. This parameter is determined to ensure
that in the steady state of the model, when banks have a debt-asset ratio of about 0:9, there is a
13 basis point spread between interbank rates and the risk free rate, the average quarterly spread
between the 3-month Libor and the 3-month T-bill from 1984 to 2007.
The cost of liquidation and the idiosyncratic bankruptcy risk in the entrepreneurial sector, ￿e
and ￿e are jointly determined. These parameters ensure that in the steady state of the model,
when ￿rms in the entrepreneurial sector have a debt-asset ratio of 0:5, an entrepreneur faces a 2%
probability of bankruptcy and the steady state spread between the interest rate on physical capital
7From the demand functions for domestically supplied intermediate inputs and imports, equations (3) and (4),

























23loans and the bank￿ s cost of capital is approximately 70 basis points.8
3.1 Exogenous Shock Processes
In this model there are two types of shocks. The ￿rst shock is simply a country speci￿c shock to
total factor productivity (TFP) in (1). The second shock is a shock to the uncertainty about the
health of a bank￿ s assets, ￿b
t, and is unique to a model with ￿nancial frictions in the banking sector.
Since TFP shocks are not the primary focus of the study, we set the exogenous process that
governs TFP shocks to a simple process that is familiar in the real business cycle literature. Shocks
to TFP, ^ At follow an AR(1) process with an autoregressive coe¢ cient of 0:9. Since the model is
solved using a ￿rst order approximation, we simply normalize the variance of the shocks to TFP to
one. To ensure comparability across the closed and open economy versions of the model, we assume
that TFP follows this same process regardless of country type, this ensures that any di⁄erences in
optimal policy between the two versions of the model are due to the internal dynamics of the model
and not the exogenous shock process.
Alternatively we can consider shocks to the ￿nancial sector uncertainty variable, ￿b
t+1. Equation
(16) describes how ￿ uctuations in the interbank lending spread can be broken down into two
components, one due to ￿ uctuations in the endogenous cuto⁄value ￿ !b
t+1, and one due to exogenous



















We construct a time series of the interbank spread rpb
t by taking the di⁄erence between the 3-
month USD Libor and the 3-month T-bill from 1985:1-2010:3 (alternatively we consider the period
1985:1-2007:2). A time series of the cuto⁄ value ￿ !b
t+1 is constructed using data on U.S. commercial
bank debt asset ratios, loan delinquency rates, the prime rate, and the 3-month USD Libor over the
same period. In an OLS regression where r^ pb














is the residual, the estimated coe¢ cient ^ g1 = ￿0:274 with a standard
error of 0:079 and an R2 = 0:108 (for the 1985:1-2007:2 period ^ g1 = ￿0:258 with SE = 0:053 and
8The calibration that entrepreneurs have a steady state debt-asset ratio of about 0:5 and banks have a steady state
debt-asset ratio of about 0:9 is based on the historical average debt-asset ratios for U.S. non-￿nancial and ￿nancial
￿rms as reported in the Federal Reserve￿ s Flow of Funds Accounts.
24R2 = 0:211).








to estimate an AR(1) process for ￿b
t+1 and ￿nd that
the ￿nancial sector uncertainty variable has an autoregressive coe¢ cient of 0:74. When presenting
the results in the next section, we will parameterize the exogenous shock process for ￿b
t+1 such that
the autoregressive coe¢ cient is 0:74, but we will experiment with the variance of the process and
￿nd that when identi￿ed correctly, the optimal monetary policy is largely invariant to the variance
of the exogenous ￿nancial sector uncertainty shocks, ￿b
t+1.
4 Results
To ￿nd the optimal coe¢ cients in the central bank￿ s Taylor rule and access how these optimal
parameters change as the degree of ￿nancial sector risk in the economy changes, we ￿rst have to
de￿ne the loss function that the central bank will attempt to minimize. In order to ensure that the
changes in optimal policy are due to changes in the endogenous structure of the economy and the
transmission mechanism and not due to changes in the central bank￿ s preferences, this loss function
should remain the same regardless of the degree of ￿nancial sector risk in the economy.
When ￿nding the optimal coe¢ cients in the Taylor rule, the central bank will attempt to
minimize:
L = var(￿t) + 0:5 ￿ var(^ yt) + 0:1 ￿ var(it ￿ it￿1)
where ￿t is the in￿ ation rate, ^ yt is the output gap, and it￿it￿1 is the quarter-over-quarter di⁄erence
in the nominal risk free interest rate.
4.1 The parameters in the conventional Taylor rule
To evaluate how monetary policy should respond to ￿nancial sector risk, we ￿rst identify the optimal
weights on in￿ ation, the output gap, and the lagged interest rate in the Taylor rule function in the
model where business cycles are driven by productivity shocks. We ￿nd these optimal parameters
three times, in a model without a ￿nancial accelerator, ￿e = ￿b = 0, in a model with a ￿nancial
accelerator only in the entrepreneurial sector, ￿e > 0 and ￿b = 0, and in a model with a ￿nancial
accelerator in both the entrepreneurial and banking sectors, ￿e > 0 and ￿b > 0.
25We ￿nd these parameters through a grid search. We vary ￿p, ￿y, and ￿i until we ￿nd the
combination of the three terms in the central bank￿ s Taylor rule function that minimizes the central
bank￿ s loss function. The results from this search are presented in table 2. The table presents
optimal parameters for both the closed economy and the open economy versions of the model.
In the benchmark parameterization of the model, regardless of country type, the presence of
a ￿nancial accelerator in the model means that the central bank will want to put more weight on
the lagged interest rate. In the closed economy version of the model, the optimal coe¢ cient on the
lagged interest rate increases from 0:74 in the version of the model with no ￿nancial frictions to
0:76 in the model with ￿nancial frictions only in the real sector, to 0:78 in the model with frictions
in both the real and ￿nancial sectors. The results for the open economy version of the model show
a similar trend.
Similarly, as the level of ￿nancial frictions in the model increases, the central bank will put more
weight on in￿ ation and less weight on the output gap. In the closed economy, adding a ￿nancial
accelerator in both the entrepreneurial and banking sectors means that the central bank will want
to increase the weight on in￿ ation by 0:05 from 1:62 to 1:67, and they will decrease the weight on
the output gap by the same (absolute) amount from 0:4 to 0:35.
Thus as the level of ￿nancial frictions in the model increases, the central bank will want to put
more weight on the lagged interest rate as opposed to contemporaneous variables, and more weight
on in￿ ation as opposed to output.
In table 2, ￿nancial frictions lead to endogenous changes in lending spreads (either the entre-
preneurial lending spread, re
t ￿ rb
t, or the interbank spread, rb
t ￿ it) in response to ￿ uctuations in
balance sheets and asset prices that are ultimately caused by an exogenous productivity shocks.
Many recent papers have also considered the role of exogenous ￿nancial shocks. In this model, ex-
ogenous ￿nancial shocks take the form of exogenous shocks to the interbank credit supply schedule.
As described in equation (16), ￿ uctuations in the interbank lending rate are driven by endogenous
￿ uctuations in ￿ !b
t, the cuto⁄ value for insolvency in the banking sector, which is determined by en-
dogenous variables like debt-asset ratios and loan loss ratios, and exogenous ￿ uctuations in ￿b
t, the
stochastic variable that measures the degree of ex-ante uncertainty about the health of a particular
bank￿ s assets.
De￿ne ￿ as the standard deviation of the exogenous ￿ uctuations in the interbank lending spread.
26The standard deviation of exogenous TFP ￿ uctuations is normalized to one, so ￿ measures the ratio
of the standard deviations of the two shocks in the model, the exogenous shocks to the interbank













The optimal weights on in￿ ation, the output gap, and the lagged interest rate under di⁄erent
values of ￿ are presented in table 3. It should ￿rst be noted that in this model, exogenous ￿nancial
shocks only make sense in the version of the model with a ￿nancial accelerator in both the entre-
preneurial and banking sectors. The case where ￿ = 0, and thus TFP shocks are the only active
shocks, is the same as the "Bank FA" rows of table 2.
An interesting result comes out of the results in table 3. As ￿, the strength of exogenous credit
shocks, increases, the central bank will want to put slightly more weight on the lagged interest rate.
Quantitatively, the shift in ￿i is small, it is only interesting because it seems to ￿t well with the
results from table 2, as the strength of the ￿ uctuations in interbank borrowing spreads increases,
the central bank will want to put more weight on the lagged interest rate.
However, this connection between table 2 and 3 does not hold when considering the e⁄ect of an
increasing ￿ on ￿p. In table 2, when added layers of ￿nancial frictions lead to increased variability
in the interbank lending spread, the central bank would want to respond by placing more weight
on in￿ ation and less on the output gap. In table 3, when the increasing severity of ￿nancial sector
shocks is leading to increased variability in the interbank lending spread, the central bank will
want to respond by placing less weight on in￿ ation and more weight on the output gap. This
fact that the central bank￿ s optimal response to variability in the spread depends on whether that
variability is the endogenous reaction to real variables in the model like balance sheets and default
rates or whether it is the reaction to exogenous credit shocks is a theme that will appear in the
next subsection where we consider the desirability of including spreads in the Taylor rule.
Also, notice the last column in table 3. This column reports the distance between the value of
the loss function when the Taylor rule parameters are optimally chosen and the value of the loss
function under the Ramsey true optimal policy.9 Thus when there are only TFP shocks in the
9In the open economy case, the true optimal is de￿ned as the cooperative Ramsey equilibrium.
27model, the value of the loss function under the optimal Taylor rule is about 15% higher than the
value in the true optimum. As ￿ increases, the Taylor rule function of in￿ ation, the output gap,
and the lagged interest rate becomes as worse approximation of optimal policy. When ￿ = 0:2, the
minimum value of the loss function under the Taylor rule is 26% higher than the true optimum.
4.2 The optimal weight on the interbank lending spread
The previous section discusses how a central bank would shift the relative weights in their Taylor
rule function towards interest rate stability and (maybe) price level stability when there is variability
in the interbank lending spread. This section will consider if in addition to doing this, is there any
bene￿t to putting a measure of ￿nancial risk, like interbank lending spreads, directly in the Taylor
rule.
Recall from equation (21), ￿r and ￿rf are the weights on the home and foreign interbank lending
spreads, respectively, in the central bank￿ s Taylor rule. If ￿r = 0, then the central bank does not
react to changes in home interbank lending spreads, but if ￿r < 0, the central bank responds to an
increase in interbank lending spreads by lowering the nominal risk free rate.
We use the same procedure that was used to calculate the results in tables 2 and 3, only now
instead of ￿nding the optimal coe¢ cients ￿p, ￿y, and ￿i, we vary ￿p, ￿y, ￿i, and ￿r (and ￿rf for the
open economy case). These optimal coe¢ cients are presented in table 4. The table presents the
optimal Taylor rule coe¢ cients as a function of the standard deviation of the exogenous ￿nancial
sector shocks, ￿, for both the closed economy and the open economy versions of the model.
The ￿rst and most important ￿nding in the table is that the optimal coe¢ cient on the interbank
spread is zero when ￿ is zero. In other words, when the conventional Taylor rule parameters are
chosen optimally, there is no need to also include interbank spreads in the central bank￿ s policy
function provided that any ￿ uctuations in the spread are endogenous reactions to real shocks in the
model. If ￿ uctuations in the spread are the endogenous reaction to ￿ uctuations in real and nominal
variables in the model, then interbank spreads provide no new information that is not already
provided by measures of the output gap and in￿ ation. If the central bank chooses the optimal
weights on the output gap and in￿ ation, then there is no need to also pay attention to changes
in spreads. If the central bank assigns a non-zero coe¢ cient on the interbank spread, ￿r < 0 or
￿rf < 0, the weighting of the available information is no longer optimal.
28This result changes when the model is also driven by exogenous ￿nancial sector shocks. When
there are exogenous ￿nancial sector shocks, there is information in the interbank spread that may
not be contained in readings of current in￿ ation and the current output gap. Thus the central bank
may ￿nd it worthwhile to also pay attention to interbank spreads, ￿r < 0 and ￿rf < 0, given that
they potentially contain new information that is not already factored into the optimal weighting of
the output gap and in￿ ation.
The table shows that as the standard deviation of the exogenous ￿nancial sector shocks increases,
the amount of new information contained in the interbank spread increases and thus the coe¢ cient
on the interbank spread increases (in absolute value). This highlights the fact that when setting
a non-zero coe¢ cient to the interbank spread, the central bank faces a trade-o⁄. When there
are exogenous ￿nancial sector shocks in the model, ￿ uctuations in the spread are driven by both
endogenous and exogenous factors. Since the endogenous ￿ uctuations contain no new information
that is not already contained in the optimally chosen weighting of in￿ ation and the output gap,
assigning any weight to these endogenous components is suboptimal. However the exogenous
component does contain new information, and thus ignoring this component is suboptimal. When
increasing the weight on the interbank spread, the central bank is balancing the marginal bene￿t
of increasing the coe¢ cient on the exogenous component against the marginal cost of increasing
the weight on the endogenous component. Thus when ￿ = 0:05, the exogenous ￿nancial sector
shocks are weak enough that the cost still outweighs the bene￿t and thus the optimal coe¢ cient
is zero, ￿r = 0 or ￿rf = 0. When ￿ = 0:10 the exogenous ￿nancial sector shock is stronger and
now the marginal bene￿t of including spreads in the Taylor rule equals the marginal cost at a
non-zero coe¢ cient. When ￿ = 0:20 the exogenous ￿nancial shock is stronger still and thus the
marginal bene￿t of targeting the exogenous component of the spread is equal to the marginal cost
of targeting the endogenous component at an even higher coe¢ cient (in absolute value).
Recall from table 3 that when ￿ increases, the conventional Taylor rule quickly becomes a poor
approximation for the true optimal policy. When ￿ = 0, the value of the loss function under the
Taylor rule is about 15% higher than the value under the Ramsey solution but when ￿ = 0:2, the
conventional Taylor rule now misses the true optimum by 26%. This trend is largely halted when
the Taylor rule is also a function of the interbank lending spread. Table 4 shows that when ￿ = 0,
the Taylor rule with interbank lending spreads as a potential argument misses the true optimum by
2915%, and when ￿ = 0:2 the modi￿ed Taylor rule only misses the true optimum by about 17%. Thus
when credit shocks are a potential source of economic ￿ uctuations, including interbank spreads in
the Taylor rule leads to a signi￿cant improvement over conventional monetary policy that is simply
a function of in￿ ation and the output gap.
4.2.1 The optimal weights when endogenous ￿ uctuations are separated from exoge-
nous ￿ uctuations
Given that when setting the optimal coe¢ cients on the home and foreign interbank lending spreads
the central bank must balance the bene￿t of targeting the exogenous component of the spread
against the cost of targeting the endogenous component of the spread, the natural question arises,
what are the optimal coe¢ cients on the home and foreign interbank lending spreads when the
central bank can distinguish between endogenous and exogenous ￿ uctuations?
The optimal coe¢ cients on interbank lending spreads assuming that the central bank can dis-
tinguish between endogenous and exogenous components of the spread are presented in table 5.
The results in the table con￿rm the earlier intuition. The optimal policy is to assign a coe¢ cient
of zero to endogenous ￿ uctuations in the spread while assign a negative coe¢ cient to exogenous
￿ uctuations. Thus the optimal policy is to ignore endogenous ￿ uctuations since they contain no
new information that is not already contained in the optimal weighting of the output gap and the
in￿ ation rate, but at the same time accommodate exogenous ￿ uctuations in the spread, and thus
lower the nominal risk free rate in response to an exogenous increase in the interbank spread.
In the closed economy version of the model, the central bank should ignore endogenous ￿ uc-
tuations in the spread and lower the risk free rate in the long run by about 1 percentage point
for every 1 percentage point increase in the interbank lending spread that can be attributed to an
exogenous credit shock. The results are fairly stable, the central bank will want to pursue a similar
policy regardless of the relative strength of the exogenous ￿nancial shocks.
Furthermore, the results for the open economy are similar, but now instead of only focusing
on exogenous ￿ uctuations in the domestic interbank spread, the central bank also responds to
exogenous ￿ uctuations in the foreign spread. In the closed economy case, the central bank cut the
risk free rate by about 100 basis points in response to a 100 basis point increase in the exogenous
portion of the spread, in the open economy case, the central bank cuts the risk free rate by about
3070 basis points in response to a 100 basis point increase in the exogenous portion of the domestic
spread and by about 30 basis points in response to a similar increase in the foreign spread.
The last column of table 5 shows again that when the Taylor rule is also a function of interbank
lending spreads, the Taylor rule continues to be a good approximation for optimal policy even as the
severity of the exogenous ￿nancial shocks increases. Furthermore a comparison of the last column
in table 4 with that in table 5 shows that there is a slight welfare improvement when the central
bank is able to distinguish between the endogenous and exogenous portions of the spread. In the
closed economy, when ￿ = 0:2, the modi￿ed Taylor rule where the central bank cannot identify the
the source of the ￿ uctuations in the spread yields a loss function about 17:7% above the optimum,
when the central bank can distinguish between di⁄erent types of ￿ uctuations, the value of the loss
function is only 16:7% above the optimum.
4.2.2 The optimal use of interbank spreads as an intermediate target (or instrument)
In congressional testimony, Taylor (2008) describes the experience of the Swiss National Bank in
the early days of the 2007-2009 ￿nancial crisis. Unlike the Federal Reserve and most other central
banks which use a short term nominal risk free rate as their intermediate target, the intermediate
target for the Swiss National Bank is the 3-month interbank rate. Thus if there is an exogenous
increase in ￿nancial sector risk, like that which occurred in August 2007, Swiss monetary policy is
automatically accommodative. In terms of the Taylor rule function in (22), it was as if ￿exo
r = ￿1
in the special case where ￿i = 0.
Given that there is a role for interest rate smoothing in the model, the results presented thus
far as not directly comparable to the case of using interbank rates as an intermediate target. The
results presented in table 5 show that following an exogenous one percentage point increase in the
interbank spread, the optimal policy response by the closed economy central bank is to reduce the
nominal risk free rate by about 1 percentage point in the long run.
If instead we rearrange the central bank￿ s Taylor rule function and put the risk spread outside
of the smoothing parameter then the Taylor rule function that is more comparable to changes in
the natural rate is given by:
31it+1 = iss + ￿i
￿
it ￿ iss ￿ ￿rr^ pb
t￿1 ￿ ￿rfr^ pb￿
t￿1
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿p￿t + ￿y^ yt) + ￿rr^ pb
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, if ￿rf = 0, this revised Taylor rule becomes:
rt+1 = rss + ￿i (rt) + (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿p￿t + ￿y^ yt)
where rt = ￿￿rrb
t + (1 + ￿r)it. Since ￿r ￿ 0, the revised Taylor rule simply says that the central
bank￿ s intermediate target (or instrument)10 is determined in a conventional Taylor rule with
smoothing function, and the intermediate target is a convex combination of the interbank rate and
the risk free rate. If ￿r = ￿1, the central bank uses the interbank rate as their intermediate target.
The values of ￿r and ￿rf in the alternative version of the Taylor rule in (23) that minimize the
central bank￿ s loss function are presented in table 6. The table presents the optimal combination
of parameters both for the case where the central bank cannot distinguish between endogenous and
exogenous ￿ uctuations in the interbank lending spread and thus they are grouped in the policy rule
function (Grouped), and also the case where the central bank can distinguish between the two and
thus they enter as separate terms in the Taylor rule (Separate).
The key results from the earlier analysis where interbank lending spreads were simply another
term in the Taylor rule still hold here. Mainly, the central bank will want to ignore endogenous
￿ uctuations in the spread, which contain no new information, and actively adjust the risk free rate
to accommodate exogenous ￿ uctuations in the spread.
Furthermore, the central bank will want to adjust the natural rate in response to exogenous
￿ uctuations in the home and foreign interbank lending spread, but they will not be fully accom-
modative. This would be the case where ￿r = ￿1, and thus the central bank is using the interbank
borrowing rate as their intermediate target. In the closed economy case, the central bank will want
to lower the risk free rate by about two-thirds of a percentage point in response to an exogenous
one percentage point increase in the spread. In the open economy case, the central bank will want
10Since the policy rate like the Fed Funds rate is determined in a market, it is technically not an instrument but
an intermediate target. The central bank￿ s instrument is the monetary base or the quantity of reserves. However
since most new Keynesian models simply assume that the central bank sets the policy rate according to a Taylor rule
function, is is treated as the central bank￿ s monetary policy instrument. The distinction is simply one of semantics.
32to reduce the risk free rate by about half of a percentage point in response to an exogenous one
percentage point increase in the home interbank spread and they will want to reduce the risk free
rate by about a sixth of a percentage point in response to a similar exogenous increase in the foreign
interbank spread.
The last column of the table shows that when the central bank adjusts the natural rate in
response to ￿ uctuations in the spread and can distinguish between endogenous and exogenous
￿ uctuations in the spread, the relative size of exogenous ￿nancial shocks has almost no impact on
the quality of monetary policy under the Taylor rule. In the closed economy version of the model,
when ￿ = 0, the value of the loss function under the modi￿ed Taylor rule is 15:3% above the true
optimum, when ￿ = 0:2, the modi￿ed Taylor rule yields results which are only 15:8% above the
true optimum.
4.3 Impulse responses under Ramsey optimal policy and Taylor rules with and
without spreads
In the previous section we show how including spreads in the Taylor rule can numerically bring
us closer to true optimal policy. In this section we will instead consider impulse responses to see
the path of the output gap, in￿ ation and other macro variables following a shock and show how
including spreads in the Taylor rule can make the path of these variables following a shock closer
to the true optimal path.
Figure 1 presents the responses of the output gap, in￿ ation, investment, the nominal risk free
rate, the entrepreneurial risk spread (re
t ￿ rb
t), and the interbank lending spread (rb
t ￿ it) in the
closed economy following an exogenous shock to ￿nancial sector uncertainty. The responses are
plotted under three assumptions for monetary policy. The solid line represents Ramsey optimal
monetary policy, the dashed line is the path when policy is determined by a Taylor rule function
of the output gap, in￿ ation, and the lagged interest rate, and the line with stars is the path when
monetary policy is determined by a Taylor rule function of the output gap, in￿ ation, the lagged
interest rate, and the interbank lending spread.11
The entire process is driven by an exogenous 30 basis point increase in the interbank lending
11In the case of the optimally chosen conventional Taylor rule without spreads, we use the coe¢ cients from the
￿ = 0:2 line of table 3. The parameters for the optimally chosen modi￿ed Taylor rule are taken from the ￿ = 0:2
line of table 4.
33spread, as shown in the lower right-hand diagram. When monetary policy is determined by a
conventional Taylor rule without interbank lending spreads, this exogenous increase in the spread
leads to a 4% fall in investment and a 60 basis point increase in the gap between potential and
actual output. If however monetary policy is the true optimal, there is a sudden cut in the risk
free rate. This ensures that there is only a 2% fall in investment and a slight improvement in the
output gap.
When spreads are included in the Taylor rule, the path of the risk free rate following the shock
is closer to the path determined by Ramsey optimal policy. As a result the path of investment and
the output gap when policy is determined by the Taylor rule with spreads is very similar to the
optimal policy under Ramsey policy.
It should be noted however that the policy of including spreads in the Taylor rule, while closer to
true optimal policy than when spreads are ignored, is not costless. The exogenous ￿nancial sector
uncertainty shock is a shock to the e¢ ciency of ￿nancial intermediation. Speci￿cally it represents
a shift in the supply curve in the interbank lending market. The central bank can cut the risk free
rate to accommodate the shock, but it cannot reverse the shock. The cost of accommodation is
higher in￿ ation, as shown in the top right-hand diagram in the ￿gure. Speci￿cally, when monetary
policy is determined by a Taylor rule with spreads, accommodating the exogenous 30 basis point
increase in the interbank lending spread results in a 10 ￿ 15 basis point increase in in￿ ation.
Figure 2 presents the responses of the same variables in the closed economy to a TFP shock. Here
any movement in the interbank lending spread in the lower right-hand diagram is an endogenous
reaction to changes in real variables. In response to a TFP shock, there is not much of a di⁄erence
between policy under the conventional Taylor rule and under the Taylor rule with spreads. The
￿gure also shows that the responses under the Taylor rules are pretty similar to those under Ramsey
policy, implying that the Taylor rule is a close approximation to optimal policy in the model in
response to TFP shocks. The di⁄erence is that the optimal response seems to allow a little more
in￿ ation and thus there is less of a fall in the output gap and investment following the shock.
Figure 3 presents the responses of the same variables, but this time in the open economy model
in response to a foreign exogenous ￿nancial sector uncertainty shock.12 Again, the dashed line in
12The responses in the open economy to a home shock looks very similar to the responses in the closed economy,
and thus have been omitted for brevity
34the ￿gure represents the optimal Taylor rule function of the output gap, in￿ ation, and the lagged
interest rate in the open economy version of the model, and the line with stars plots the optimal
responses when the Taylor rule is also a function of both home and foreign interbank lending
spreads. The solid line in the ￿gure plots the responses where monetary policy in both countries is
determined in a cooperative Ramsey equilibrium.
When spreads are included in the Taylor rule, monetary policy reacts to the endogenous ￿ uctu-
ations in the home interbank spread, which are plotted in the lower right-hand diagram, but policy
also reacts to (largely exogenous) movements in the foreign interbank spread (not pictured). As a
result, monetary policy is much more accommodative when spreads are included in the policy rule,
and investment and the output gap are higher when spreads are included in the rule, and there is
an endogenous fall in both the entrepreneurial risk spread and the interbank lending spread.
What is interesting from the ￿gure is how closely the responses under the modi￿ed Taylor
rule track the true optimal policy. For all six variables in the ￿gure, the line with stars is nearly
indistinguishable from the solid line, implying that the modi￿ed Taylor rule is very close to the
true optimal policy.
It should be noted that in this open economy version of the model where the shock is to foreign
￿nancial sector uncertainty, the modi￿ed Taylor rule does not produce the same sharp increase in
in￿ ation as in the closed economy version of the model. Recall that in ￿gure 3 the two countries are
symmetric. The home country central bank with a modi￿ed Taylor rule is cutting interest rates in
response to an increase in the foreign interbank lending spread, but at the same time, the foreign
country central bank is cutting interest rates in response to an increase in domestic interbank
lending spreads. Recall also from table 4 that the foreign central bank will react more strongly to
this increase in spreads in the foreign country. With the foreign central bank cutting rates by more
in response to the same shock, the home country currency will appreciate. This will hold down
import price in￿ ation and thus overall consumer in￿ ation even through under the modi￿ed Taylor
rule, the home country central bank is following an accommodative monetary policy in response to
the foreign ￿nancial sector shock.
Finally, ￿gure 4 presents the responses of the same variables to a foreign TFP shock under the
three di⁄erent monetary policy scenarios. As before in the closed economy version of the model, the
￿gure shows that including interbank lending spreads in the Taylor rule are of little consequence
35following a TFP shock.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a framework to think about how monetary policy should react to periods of
stress in the ￿nancial markets. Speci￿cally, should the central bank incorporate interbank lending
spreads into their Taylor rule function.
The answer is a resounding maybe! More speci￿cally, it should depend on whether or not the
spread contains any new information that isn￿ t already contained in measures of the output gap
and in￿ ation. If the coe¢ cients in the Taylor rule policy function are chosen optimally, then the
central bank has already chosen the optimal weighting to assign to information contained in the
output gap and information contained in the in￿ ation rate. Thus assigning any weight to a new
term like the interbank lending spread that contains no new information is suboptimal.
However when ￿ uctuations in the interbank rate are driven by exogenous ￿nancial sector shocks,
the central bank may want to reduce the risk free rate in response to an exogenous increase in the
interbank lending spread. However full accommodation is too extreme. Calculations from the
model instead show that the central bank will want to reduce the natural rate by about two-
thirds of a percentage point in response to a one percentage point increase in the spread, and thus
interestingly, while accommodation is warranted, full accommodation of the exogenous ￿nancial
shock is too much.
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40A Technical Appendix
This appendix will present some of the more technical derivations in the paper related to the nominal
rigidities and ￿nancial frictions present in the model. The ￿rst part of the appendix, section A.1
presents the derivations involved with the Calvo style wage and price equations. The second part of




In any given period, household j faces a probability of 1 ￿ ￿w of being able to reset their wage,
otherwise it is reset automatically according to Wt (l) = ￿t￿1Wt￿1 (l), where ￿t￿1 =
Pt￿1
Pt￿2.
If household j is allowed to reset their wages in period t they will set a wage to maximize the

















1 if ￿ = 0
￿t+￿￿1￿t;t+￿￿1 if ￿ > 0
The imperfect combination of labor from di⁄erent households is described in (20). Use this












1￿￿ is the average wage across households, and Ht is aggregate labor
supplied by all households.
13We assume complete contingent claims markets among households within a country. This implies that the
marginal utility of consumption is the same across all households within a country, regardless of their income.
Therefore the total utility from the consumption of labor income in any period is simply the country speci￿c marginal
utility of comsumption, ￿t, multiplied by the household￿ s labor income, Wt (l)Nt (l).
41Substitute the labor demand function into the maximization problem to express the maximiza-






































































Thus when wages are ￿ exible the wage rate is equal to a mark-up, ￿
(￿￿1), multiplied by the
marginal disutility of labor, 1+￿H
￿H   (Ht)
1
￿H , divided by the marginal utility of consumption, ￿t.
Write the wage rate for the household that can reset wages in period t, Wt (l), as ~ Wt (l) to
denote it as an optimal wage. Also note that all households that can reset wages in period t will
reset to the same wage rate, so ~ Wt (l) = ~ Wt.
All households face a probability of (1 ￿ ￿w) of being able to reset their wages in a given period,
so by the law of large numbers (1 ￿ ￿w) of households can reset their wages in a given period. The
wages of the other ￿w will automatically reset by the previous periods in￿ ation rate.















A.1.2 Sticky Output Prices
Domestic Prices In the model, intermediate goods prices are sticky. Intermediate goods ￿rms
can set separate domestic and export prices.
42In period t, the ￿rm will be able to change it￿ s price in the domestic market with probability




The ￿rm that can reset prices in period t will choose Pd














t+￿ (i) ￿ MCt+￿yd
t+￿ (i)
o
where MCt+￿ is marginal cost of production in period t + ￿.
The ￿rm￿ s domestic demand is given in (3). Substitute this demand function into the maxi-

























































































which says that the ￿rm will set a price equal to a constant mark-up over marginal cost.
Write the domestic price set by the ￿rm that can reset prices in period t as ~ Pd
t (i) to denote
that it is an optimal price. Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same level,
so ~ Pd
t (i) = ~ Pd













and use the fact that in any period 1 ￿ ￿p percent of ￿rms will reoptimize prices, and the prices of
￿p percent of ￿rms will be automatically reset using the previous periods in￿ ation rate, to derive


















Export Prices Domestic ￿rm i, where i 2 [0;n], will set a price Pm￿
t (i) for its intermediate
input in the foreign market.
The demand for the intermediate good from domestic ￿rm i in the rest of the world is given by:
ym￿
















In period t, the ￿rm will be able to change it￿ s export price with probability 1 ￿ ￿p. If the
￿rm cannot change its price in the foreign market then it is reset automatically according to
Pm￿
t (i) = ￿￿
t￿1Pm￿






If domestic ￿rm i was last able to change their export price in period t, the demand for the
intermediate good from ￿rm i in the rest of the world in period t + ￿ is:
ym￿

















The ￿rm that can reset prices in period t will choose Pm￿


















t+￿ (i) ￿ MCt+￿ym￿
t+￿ (i)
￿
where St is the nominal exchange rate denoted in units of the foreign currency per units of the
home currency.






















































t (i) as the optimal price for the foreign market set by a ￿rm that was able to change
their prices in period t. Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same level, so
~ Pm￿
t (i) = ~ Pm￿











and use the fact that in any period 1 ￿ ￿p percent of ￿rms will reoptimize prices, and the prices of
￿p percent of ￿rms will be automatically reset using the previous periods in￿ ation rate, to derive



















The derivation of the various interest rates in the model, re
t, rb
t, rwc
t is presented in the text. However













t(k) , was equal across all banks. This section of the appendix will present the
formal proof to both of these claims.
A.2.1 Entrepreneurial sector
Prove: DAe
t+1 (i) = DAe
t+1 (j) :
Entrepreneur i will purchase capital up to the point where:
1 + re










































does not depend on any characteristics that are speci￿c to entre-
preneur i, in equilibrium re
t+1 (i) = re
t+1 (j) for any two entrepreneurs i and j.
Proof by contradiction:
Suppose DAe
t+1 (i) < DAe
t+1 (j)















































t+1 (1 ￿ ￿)
If DAe







Kt(j), so ￿ !e
t (i) < ￿ !e
t (j) and re
t (i) < re
t (j).
This contradicts with the earlier equilibrium condition that re
t+1 (i) = re
t+1 (j), thus DAe
t+1 (i) ￿
DAe
t+1 (j) and since the choice of i and j where arbitrary the only possible equilibrium is one where
DAe




t+1 (i) = DAb
t+1 (j) :
Bank i will make loans up to the point where:
1 + rb

































t+1 (i) = rb
t+1 (j) for any two banks i and j.
Proof by contradiction:
Suppose DAb
t+1 (i) < DAb
t+1 (j)















































t+1(j) , so ￿ !b
t+1 (i) > ￿ !b




This contradicts with the earlier equilibrium condition that rb
t+1 (i) = rb
t+1 (j), thus DAb
t+1 (i) ￿
DAb
t+1 (j) and since the choice of i and j where arbitrary the only possible equilibrium is one where
DAb
t+1 (i) = DAb
t+1 (j).
47Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Symbol Value Description
￿ 0:99 discount factor
￿ 0:025 depreciation rate
￿ 0:36 capital￿ s share of income
￿ 1:5 substitution elasticity between home and foreign goods
￿b 0:01 cost of adjusting foreign bond holdings
￿n 1 labor supply elasticity
￿ 10 substitution elasticity across goods from domestic ￿rms
￿ 21 substitution elasticity across di⁄erentiated labor inputs
￿ 0:125 capital adjustment cost parameter
￿p 0:62 probability that a ￿rm cannot change prices in the current period
￿w 0:75 probability that a worker cannot change wages in the current period
￿ 0:78 weight on domestic goods (open economy)
￿f 0:26 weight on imported goods (open economy)
￿ 0:271 ￿xed cost in production
  0:021 coe¢ cient on labor e⁄ort in the utility function
￿b 1:133 standard deviation of idiosyncratic bank shocks
￿e 0:134 cost of liquidation in the entrepreneurial sector
￿e 0:370 standard deviation of idiosyncratic entrepreneur shocks
Table 2: The optimal coe¢ cients on in￿ ation, the output gap, and the lagged interest rate in the
central bank￿ s Taylor rule in the model with and the model without a ￿nancial accelerator.
￿p ￿y ￿i
Closed
No FA 1:621 0:404 0:740
Ent FA 1:658 0:366 0:764
Bank FA 1:671 0:350 0:783
Open
No FA 1:640 0:388 0:719
Ent FA 1:672 0:354 0:751
Bank FA 1:684 0:340 0:772
48Table 3: The optimal coe¢ cients on home and foreign interbank lending spreads.
￿p ￿y ￿i Rel. Loss
Closed
￿ = 0 1:671 0:350 0:783 15:3%
￿ = 0:05 1:670 0:353 0:783 16:0%
￿ = 0:10 1:667 0:359 0:783 18:1%
￿ = 0:15 1:662 0:369 0:783 21:5%
￿ = 0:20 1:657 0:379 0:785 25:8%
Open
￿ = 0 1:684 0:340 0:772 15:3%
￿ = 0:05 1:682 0:343 0:772 16:1%
￿ = 0:10 1:677 0:351 0:772 18:3%
￿ = 0:15 1:671 0:362 0:773 21:9%
￿ = 0:20 1:664 0:374 0:776 26:2%
Table 4: The optimal coe¢ cients on home and foreign interbank lending spreads.
￿p ￿y ￿i ￿r ￿rf Rel. Loss
Closed
￿ = 0 1:670 0:350 0:783 0:000 na 15:3%
￿ = 0:05 1:669 0:352 0:783 0:000 na 16:0%
￿ = 0:10 1:669 0:353 0:789 ￿0:631 na 16:9%
￿ = 0:15 1:671 0:349 0:791 ￿0:799 na 17:3%
￿ = 0:20 1:674 0:345 0:791 ￿0:846 na 17:7%
Open
￿ = 0 1:684 0:340 0:772 0:000 0:000 15:3%
￿ = 0:05 1:682 0:342 0:774 ￿0:170 0:000 16:1%
￿ = 0:10 1:681 0:341 0:779 ￿0:555 ￿0:128 16:7%
￿ = 0:15 1:682 0:338 0:780 ￿0:632 ￿0:217 17:1%
￿ = 0:20 1:683 0:333 0:780 ￿0:663 ￿0:249 17:5%
49Table 5: The optimal coe¢ cients on the endogenous and exogenous parts of the home and foreign
interbank lending spreads.






￿ = 0 1:670 0:349 0:783 0:000 na na na 15:3%
￿ = 0:05 1:670 0:353 0:783 0:000 na 0:000 na 16:0%
￿ = 0:10 1:667 0:359 0:783 0:000 na ￿1:024 na 15:1%
￿ = 0:15 1:662 0:369 0:783 0:000 na ￿0:953 na 15:9%
￿ = 0:20 1:657 0:379 0:785 0:000 na ￿0:940 na 16:7%
Open
￿ = 0 1:684 0:340 0:772 0:000 0:000 na na 15:3%
￿ = 0:05 1:682 0:343 0:772 0:000 0:000 ￿1:198 ￿0:490 16:1%
￿ = 0:10 1:677 0:351 0:772 0:000 0:000 ￿0:752 ￿0:309 15:2%
￿ = 0:15 1:671 0:362 0:773 0:000 0:000 ￿0:705 ￿0:293 15:9%











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































51Figure 1: Responses in the closed economy to a shock to ￿nancial sector uncertainty. Calculated
under three assumptions for monetary policy, Ramsey optimal policy (solid line), the conventional
Taylor rule (dashed line), and the modi￿ed Taylor rule that is a function of interbank lending
spreads (line with stars).
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52Figure 2: Responses in the closed economy to a one percent TFP shock. Calculated under three
assumptions for monetary policy, Ramsey optimal policy (solid line), the conventional Taylor rule
(dashed line), and the modi￿ed Taylor rule that is a function of interbank lending spreads (line
with stars).
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53Figure 3: Responses in the open economy to a shock to foreign ￿nancial sector uncertainty. Cal-
culated under three assumptions for monetary policy, Ramsey optimal policy (solid line), the con-
ventional Taylor rule (dashed line), and the modi￿ed Taylor rule that is a function of interbank
lending spreads (line with stars).
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54Figure 4: Responses in the open economy to a one percent foreign TFP shock. Calculated under
three assumptions for monetary policy, Ramsey optimal policy (solid line), the conventional Taylor
rule (dashed line), and the modi￿ed Taylor rule that is a function of interbank lending spreads (line
with stars).
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